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A commentary on
What is the most sensitive measure of water 
maze probe test performance?
by Hamid R. Maei, Kirill Zaslavsky, Afra H. 
Wang, Adelaide P. Yiu, Catia M. Teizeira, 
Sheena A. Josselyn and Paul W. Frankland 
The Morris water maze, a spatial learning 
task ﬁ  rst introduced by Dr. Richard Morris 
(Morris, 1981, 1984), is one of the most 
extensively used behavioral paradigms 
used to examine hippocampus-dependent 
spatial learning and memory in rodents, 
such as rats and mice (Tanda et al., 2009). 
In water maze tests, animals are forced to 
swim in a circular pool of milky water. In 
order to escape from the water, the animals 
are required to locate a submerged hidden 
platform with the aid of spatial cues sur-
rounding the water pool. Once practiced, 
the animals begin to learn the relationship 
between the platform location and various 
spatial cues, and eventually form a mem-
ory of the location of the hidden platform 
(Morris, 1984). To determine whether ani-
mals acquire a spatial learning about the 
location of the hidden platform and are 
able to search for the platform solely by 
relying on spatial memory, probe trials are 
performed where the escape platform is 
removed from the pool and the animals 
are permitted to swim and search the pool 
for 1 min. In the probe trial, the occupa-
tional time spent in the speciﬁ  c quadrant 
where the platform was originally placed 
and the number of crossings through the 
former hidden platform location are used 
as general measures to quantify the level 
of spatial memory.
Since its development, the water maze 
has become the core assay of behavioral 
test batteries used to analyze hippocam-
pus-dependent brain functions, and has 
subsequently been exploited to explore the 
functions of other areas of the brain (Tsien 
et al., 1996; D’Hooge and De Deyn, 2001). 
Moreover, a variety of protocols, including 
reversal training and delayed matching-to-
place paradigm, have been established for 
investigating the role of speciﬁ  c genes or 
proteins in normal and abnormal brain 
functions (Tsien et  al., 1996; Gallagher 
and Rapp, 1997; Lipp and Wolfer, 1998; 
Vorhees and Williams, 2006). In contrast 
to this progress, however, few studies have 
questioned the effectiveness of the exist-
ing analytic measures, such as percent-
age quadrant time, percentage zone, and 
platform crossings, that are used in water 
maze studies. Furthermore, relatively few 
attempts have been made to improve the 
sensitivity of the water maze in order to 
detect possible subtle phenotypic changes 
that might occur between groups during 
learning (Maei et al., 2009).
In a research article published in 
Frontiers in Neuroscience,  Maei et  al. 
(2009) describe a newly developed ana-
lytical method for detecting group dif-
ferences more sensitively and accurately 
in the water maze. Herein, the authors 
introduced the concept of entropy (H) – 
a measure of the disorder of a system. 
The rationale underlying this idea is that 
over the course of water maze training, an 
animal’s search strategy might be shifted 
from disorganized to more focal searching 
(Vorhees and Williams, 2006), which can 
be considered as a reduction of disorder 
in the system. By using entropy (H) as an 
analytical measure for the water maze, 
Maei et al. (2009) argue that we can more 
fully exploit an animal’s positional data 
produced by tracking software, thereby 
providing greater sensitivity for detect-
ing phenotypic differences.
To evaluate how H works and to 
  compare the usefulness of H with existing 
measures, the authors rendered a series of 
Monte Carlo simulations and randomly 
selected individual trials from a dataset of 
more than 1600 probe tests. This approach 
allowed them to simulate water maze 
experiments with varying sample and 
effect sizes. Next, by summing two types 
of variance – error variance (the variance 
of an animal’s position with respect to the 
target; Herror) and path variance (the vari-
ance of an animal’s position with respect 
to its path; Hpath) – and using the summed 
value as a measure of the entropy of spa-
tial navigation, H could thoroughly uti-
lize the positional information from each 
tracking record. Lastly, they experimen-
tally veriﬁ  ed H using three paradigms of 
hippocampal dysfunctions.
The authors report that H outperforms 
existing measures in terms of its sensitivity 
in detecting group differences over a range 
of sample or effect sizes. As discussed by 
the authors, the excellence of H can be 
recapitulated by two points. One con-
cerns its full usage of precise positional 
information of an animal throughout the 
probe test. Represented by Herror and Hpath, 
the H measure assesses both the degree to 
which searching is focused on the former 
platform location and how focused the 
search is. Using this approach, H can 
hold a greater amount of detailed trajec-
tory information than any other measure, 
which confers exceptional sensitivity upon 
H, particularly for comparisons between 
subjects. In addition, by adjusting the 
relative weight between Herror and Hpath, 
H can be adjusted to outperform other 
measures under various experimental 
conditions. The second point is that the 
H measure turns out to be distributed 
normally, which is in stark contrast to 
other measures (Maei et al., 2009). This 
characteristic gives a further advantage 
to the H measure because normality is 
a prerequisite for parametric tests, such 
as the t-test and ANOVA, to yield correct 
statistical results without type-1 errors. 
Moreover, parametric tests are the most 
widely used statistical methods for analyz-
ing behavioral test batteries.
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To summarize, the analytical approach 
described by Maei et al. (2009) provides a 
more effective and accurate new measure in 
terms of its superb sensitivity and statistical 
validity in water maze studies. Furthermore, 
the H measure will contribute greatly to 
the advancement of behavioral assays that, 
in conjunction with molecular genetic 
approaches, are designed to elucidate the 
molecular mechanisms underlying learning 
and memory.
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A commentary on
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Voluntary action is a fundamental 
  characteristic of human behavior and 
identiﬁ  es our ability to realize intention-
ally driven tasks. Functional imaging work 
has indicated that intentional perform-
ance activates neural circuitry conﬁ  ned 
to the fronto-medial cortex (Cunnington 
et al., 2002; Lau et al., 2004; Nachev et al., 
2005). This network activity integrates, 
besides the conscious experience of intend-
ing (Haggard and Clark, 2003; Lau et al., 
2004), a series of processes in relation to 
the intentional act (Brass and Haggard, 
2007). Accordingly, intentional behav-
ior can be viewed as a form of decision 
making that consists of various compo-
nents with different types of information 
processing (Brass and Haggard, 2008; 
Haggard, 2008). This distinctive viewpoint 
is important as voluntary action has often 
been regarded as a unitary concept  without 
little   consideration for the component 
functions. In this respect, it has been sug-
gested that voluntary action has at least two 
decisional processes: what action to per-
form (selection component) and when to 
perform it (timing component), (Mueller 
et al.,  2007). Thus, the “what” decision 
speciﬁ  es which action to perform from a 
range of alternative options, whereas the 
“when” decision denotes the moment in 
time at which to execute the action.
In their recent contribution to Frontiers 
in Neuroscience, Krieghoff et  al. (2009) 
presented an fMRI study that provides 
new insights into voluntary behavior. In 
particular, the authors proposed a well-
designed protocol in which they simulta-
neously and independently manipulated 
the selection and timing component within 
one experimental paradigm. Moreover, the 
  participants were instructed to perform 
one of two possible actions at one of two 
possible moments in time. Furthermore, 
the action and moment in time were freely 
chosen or externally triggered by means of 
a cue. In other words, the “what” (selec-
tion) and “when” (timing) decision of the 
impending action were based on an inter-
nal judgment or imposed by an external 
  stimulus. This distinction between inter-
nally and   externally generated responses 
is relevant as both types of activities are 
known to have (partly) dissociable neural 
circuitry in respect to the component proc-
ess of selection, as well as timing (Deiber 
et al., 1999; Cunnington et al., 2002, 2006; 
Lau et al., 2006).
As the main objective of Krieghoff et al. 
(2009) was to investigate the decisional 
processes of voluntary behavior, the data 
analysis focused primarily on the cue-
related activity that speciﬁ  ed the decision 
making process rather than on the target-
related activity that represented the imple-
mentation of that decision. In view of that 
premise, the whole-brain analysis of the 
cue-related signal showed that two fronto-
medial wall areas associated with distinct 
component functions of voluntary action: 
whereas the selection component linked 
strongly with the rostral cingulate zone 
(RCZ), the timing component tied closely 
with the superior medial frontal gyrus 
(SFG), which is localized close to pre-SMA 
(Rushworth, 2008). These results indicate 
that separate brain regions are involved in 
distinct decisional processes, and accord-
ingly highlight a functional dissociation of 